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Abstract
This article discusses some of the main challenges in doing 
and teaching bioethics from the perspective of a teacher of 
the subject. The emphasis is put on the interconnectedness 
between the methodology of teaching and the general ethical 
outlook that the teaching seeks to promote. The article is 
mainly based on practical experiences – and just a twist of 
phenomenology.
1: A very odd restaurant
To connoisseurs of the British author Douglas Adams 
and his famous trilogy (in five parts) The Hitch Hiker’s 
Guide to the Galaxy, the name Milliways signifies a lot. 
For the sake of those who have never heard of the ab-
surdly absent Mr. Adams, HHGTTG or Milliways I will 
begin this essay by briefly explaining what Milliways 
is. It is a restaurant. A restaurant that is situated at the 
end of the universe. The phrase the end of the universe
does not, however, point to any physical location (that 
would be impossible since the universe, if cosmologist 
and astro-physicists are to be believed, seems to be 
shaped like a doughnut and doughnuts have no ends) 
but rather to the peculiar fact that the restaurant is the 
result of a combination of advanced dabbling with the 
space-time continuum and risk-willing money seeking 
out new possibilities in the catering business. The truth 
is that Milliways is build on the fragmented remains of 
an eventually ruined planet which is enclosed in a vast time 
bubble and projected forward in time to the precise moment 
of the End of the Universe (Adams 1986, p. 217). This is 
of course, as both the author and probably you will 
admit, impossible. To this you can add a string of other 
impossibilities that hums around Milliways like pigs 
with new-grown wings around mud. One impossibility 
being the fact that you just have to place a penny in 
a savings account before leaving your own place and 
time, and when you seconds later arrive in the future, 
it will have accumulated enough interests to enable 
you to pay the horrendous cost of a meal at Milliways. 
All this forms the background for one of the most re-
cognized advertisement slogans in the galaxy: If you’ve 
done six impossible things this morning, why not round it 
off with breakfast at Milliways, the Restaurant at the End 
of the Universe (ibid., p. 217).
The reason that Milliways comes to mind when 
faced with the task of reflecting upon the challenges 
of teaching and thinking bioethics is this: Just as Mil-
liways in many ways is an impossible idea that carries 
with it a certain poetic beauty and truth, so is the 
concept of both doing and teaching bioethics in the 
21. Century a sort of poetic enterprise full of almost 
insurmountable challenges, but none the less an enter-
prise which makes the world a place just a little more 
interesting to spend a lifetime in. And since one of the 
most difficult challenges within the field of bioethics is 
to pass on to others what little one may have grasped 
oneself, teachers of bioethics, as did the builders of 
Milliways, set themselves a goal that is not easily ob-
tained. All teaching is faced with didactical problems 
and questions and within bioethics, which in its core is 
a multi-disciplinary research area, they seem to multiply 
like concerned bioethicists around a breakthrough in 
stem-cell research.
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This essay will describe some of these problems, 
beginning by pointing out that the problems of tea-
ching bioethics may be very different from building a 
restaurant at the end of the universe, but by no means 
smaller. There will be no clear-cut answers to the chal-
lenges described. Not that I would not give them to 
you, if I had them, mind you. But I don’t. All I have 
is a limited experience and a series of trial and error 
attempts that have taught me that successful teaching 
demands three things. A: A deep fascination of the 
subject, B: A sonar-like receptivity to the prerequisi-
tions of the students and C: A firm belief in the value 
of attempting to contribute to the complexification 
of existence for other human beings. I will, however, 
occasionally, mention if I have made any experiences 
that might benefit others.
2: Five challenges
This chapter discusses five challenges that surfaces time 
and time again when teaching and researching is the 
subject. In fact it seems that the challenges for teaching 
the subject of ethics are very closely connected to the 
challenges within the discipline of ethics itself. Whether 
this is true in general of teaching, I do not know. But 
I do know that as ethics is not a subject that you can 
learn to apply to problems in the same way that you 
can be taught to dissect a frog. Ethics is something you 
grasp with your existence. And that probably goes a 
long way in explaining why the problems of doing 
bioethics constantly surface when you try to teach it. 
The challenges will be viewed both from a research 
and an educational perspective. It should be noted from 
the outset that I strictly apply the ACOSTOE-metho-
dology throughout the whole article.1
2.1: The lack of common educational background
There is an obvious lack of educational common 
ground between people doing bioethics. All are trained 
experts in some field: Medicine, philosophy, theology, 
law, anthropology, genetic engineering, molecular bio-
logy etc., but very few have extended university based 
training in bioethics. The explanation for this is that 
such training does not exist. Bioethics is something 
you do on the basis of your expertise within a certain 
field. This means that people doing bioethics are usually 
highly academically qualified within some aspects of 
bioethics and more or less autodidact within others. 
One of the more striking consequences of this is that 
people trained in the natural sciences tend to give 
the technical or scientific part of the problem a lot of 
attention where as people trained in the humanistic 
tradition2 tend to be more interested in getting a broa-
der perspective on the problem and see it as connected 
to other problems.
It takes a lot of time and education to cross such 
barriers. Barriers as these that are a consequence of 
former education have a tendency to make the two 
sides suspicious towards one another. People coming 
from the natural sciences are often seen as some kind 
of utilitarians, which is a term that in large parts of the 
humanistic tradition has the same function as a sign 
saying »Unethical Thinking Ahead – Proceed at own 
Risk«, whereas people coming from the humanistic 
tradition has the same effect on natural scientists as the 
proverbial red flag on bulls, as they are seen as hopeless 
idealists with no understanding of the problems and 
solutions of the real world. This conflict is often hidden 
behind a pronounced will from both sides to draw the 
perspective of the other side into the debate, but at 
the end of the day usually very little has changed and 
the arguments stemming from your own perspective 
is given the most if not all importance.3
The didactic challenge in this connection is mainly 
to be able to make students interested in subjects, met-
hodologies and ways of thinking and arguing that they 
usually do not concern themselves with. As a teacher 
you have to make students of medicine and natural 
science interested in and capable of grasping rather 
complex philosophical concepts such as »person«, 
»autonomy«, »integrity« and »ethics« and somehow 
include them in their argumentation. Teaching e.g. 
philosophers is not much easier though, since they 
have to grasp and understand the consequences of 
concepts like »genes«, »cloning«, »embryonic stem 
ce ll« and »epigenetics«. Nevertheless, this is crucial 
in demonstrating to the students the rather limited 
perspective that they inevitably will be discussing bio-
ethical problems from, thus enabling them to evaluate 
their own arguments.
The way to do it is not to tell them that this is im-
portant. Nothing is more demotivating than when the 
teacher has to tell you that something is important. As 
teachers we should be able to get that point through 
simply by teaching the subject, since we ourselves hop-
efully find it important. I admit it is not easy to do this, 
but in my experience it helps a lot, if you allow the 
students to understand why you yourself find this so 
enormously important and show them how knowledge 
and emotionality are bound together.
2.2: A plurality of values
There is no consensus about the values that should 
guide bioethical decisions. No list of true and false 
results and no way of scientifically deciding what is 
good and what is evil. In a democratic, secularist and 
pluralistic society as Denmark is (at least to some de-
gree), it is impossible to find common values to use as 
a foundation for bioethical decision-making. That is, 
unless we are satisfied with a number of different values 
that are kept at a very vague level and thus begging 
the question when they get into conflict. Example: 
Which values should guide us when we have to de-

































a public health service to all pregnant couples either 
before implantation or in the beginning of pregnancy? 
The respect for the pregnant couple’s autonomy, the 
respect for the embryos, the economical benefits this 
could result in, the respect for the feelings of those 
already born with a severe genetically caused handicap, 
the wisdom of not reducing the human gene-pool in 
the light of us having no clue of its value in the future 
etc. etc. (Engelhardt 1996). All these values are to be 
debated and questioned in public and be available for 
philosophical scrutiny, but we will still end up with 
people having different values which all are, if you 
pursue their origins long enough, irrational or perhaps 
pre-rational. There is no way to prove that an embryo 
has any ethical significance, but there is no way to 
disprove it either.
The real challenge here is to convince students with 
a background in science that this does not mean that 
ethics is something purely subjective and silly. Students 
coming from the humanities are usually used to the 
idea that the truth might be something we strive to-
wards in some sort of hermeneutical movement, but 
to science students this seems very unscientific. One 
way to break down the often very rigid division bet-
ween science and the rest of the universe that exist in 
science students is to make them think through what 
consequences it would have for their personal lives, if 
they only were allowed to act on a purely scientifically 
based world-view. It is my experience that this has a 
sobering effect.
2.3: No commonly accepted purpose of bioethics
There is no consensus about the purpose of bioethics. 
This is quite natural since there is no consensus on the 
purpose of ethics. I will not give you an elaborated list 
of the different possibilities that exist within the ethical 
literature (If one goes into detail, it seems that every 
ethicist has her or his own view on the matter) but 
just draw attention to one very large demarcation-line 
that runs through the ethical landscape as philosophy’s 
version of the Grand Canyon. To some, and I am here 
referring to people coming mostly from the conse-
quentialist tradition (think of a philosopher as Peter 
Singer) and the tradition that are sometimes called 
principle-ethics (think of Beauchamp and Childress 
and the Georgetown-Mantra), the task of ethics is to 
solve problems. The ethicist is roughly speaking seen as 
an expert among others. When you are having trouble 
with your toilet you call the plumber, and when you 
have an ethical problem you call an ethicist. This is, 
with some reservations, the idea behind the multitudes 
of ethical committees, councils, advisory boards etc. 
that have broken through the fertile ground of bio-
technological progress the past 10-20 years in a degree 
that one is tempted to rephrase the famous article by 
Stephen Toulmin and say that DNA saved the life of 
ethicists (Toulmin 1982).
On the other hand you have a very diverse group 
of thinkers, about whom you can say that they have 
very little in common with the above mentionedl tra-
dition within ethics. I am thinking of people like Iris 
Murdoch, Emmanuel Levinas, Mary Midgley, and K. 
E. Løgstrup. They do not see ethics as a way of solving 
ethical problems. One of the main reasons for this is 
that if ethics is made into a list of good actions that can 
be formulated by ethicists and subsequently enacted by 
others, the whole idea of ethics breaks down. Within 
this tradition, ethics is a question of responsibility and 
of acting according to your conscience. Ethics is first 
and foremost a question of being. Being in situations, 
being aware of all aspects of them and acting in the 
right way at the right time and place according to 
your understanding of your own being and the being
of the other. Subsequently one can formulate heuristic 
principles and do the consequentialistic juggling with 
factors, but the primary task of ethics is to make people 
understand that they are responsible creatures (Lindseth 
2002). The difference is perhaps best characterized by 
claiming that the first tradition sees ethics as a tool to 
solve ethical problems with, a hammer to drive the 
ethical nail in with, whereas the other tradition sees 
ethics as a way of looking at a situation from different 
perspectives, not necessarily solving anything but per-
haps clarifying something. The Danish philosopher Ulli 
Zeitler has phrased it this way:
»Essentially, the task and reasonable expectation of 
philosophical activity is not to solve problems, alt-
hough we may advance considerably by clearing up 
the central concepts, but opening our eyes to pre-
viously unconsidered problems. The last function is 
crucial for giving new directions to future inquiries« 
Zeitler 1997, p. 39
These different approaches affect the way bioethics is 
taught too. If you want students to be problem-solvers, 
you give them the tools to solve problems, which is 
basically a set of principles that are more or less open to 
interpretation, ideas about what constitutes good and 
bad life (joy & suffering) to be used in consequentia-
listic algebra, and a firm conviction that doing good 
is a question of applying you pre-meditated ideas of 
the good to the situations you encounter. If you want 
students to be a sort of ethical light-bulbs that might 
enlighten the complexities of ethical dilemmas, you 
make them familiar with a range of different ethi-
cal positions from the tradition, train them in shifting 
their perspectives, and tell them it is not a failure that 
they cannot always do good (unless you are teaching 
them religious ethics, where this is an excellent point 
of departure for teaching them about the concepts of 
original sin and free will).
This seems fairly easy, but one should be aware that 




























































understanding of what ethics should be. Thus teaching 
science students to be light bulbs or students of theo-
logy to be problem solvers will perhaps prove hard. 
And in this rough generalization I have not taken into 
account that you often have students in the same class 
room who have formed their notion of what ethics 
should be independently of their studies. A typical 
class of 25 biotechnology students thus might have 
18 students whose pre-understanding of ethics is that 
it should be clear-cut, technically oriented, science-
based and problem solving whereas 7 of the students 
find that ethics should explore the complexities of 
human existence and evaluation, be based on everyday 
experiences and not necessarily solve anything. The 
advantage of this is that the students can learn about 
different perspectives in ethics directly during class 
discussions. But at the same time the different interests 
in the class makes it challenging not to lose any one 
group of students along the way.
2.4: How, why and who?
One thing that is almost painfully clear is that the 
seemingly innocent question How to teach bioethics is 
very dependent on the answers to two other questions: 
Why am I teaching and who am I teaching? The »why«-
question I have already touched upon. Making clear to 
oneself what the purpose of teaching bioethics is (or 
should be) seems like a vital preliminary step to take, 
if one is to have any success as a teacher. Whether one 
chooses to educate ethical problem-solvers or problem-
finders, one has to choose methods of teaching that 
are congruent with the educational goals.
But the »who«-question is probably even more im-
portant. Basically, the students can be divided into two 
groups: Those who have had prior training in philo-
sophy and ethics and those who are trained in the 
natural sciences. This means that the two groups have 
very different prerequisitions for grasping the problems 
that arise from biotechnology and that the teacher has 
to present his or her material in accordance with the 
level of student-knowledge in the different disciplines 
that bioethics contain. As mentioned above the groups 
will also differentiate themselves, thus not being so 
uniform as perhaps indicated here. But basically you 
have to teach a multi-disciplinary subject to mono-
disciplinary students – and this very often has to be 
done within a rather limited amount of time and on 
the basis of a limited amount of text material, since 
bioethics seldom is seen as a core subject.4
I believe that there is a lot of staying up all night, 
drinking too much coffee and hard thinking ahead 
in trying to answer the question of the didactics of 
bioethics. One question that could keep you awake 
for several nights is to figure out what kind of didac-
tical problems one encounters when teaching bio-
ethics within different disciplines (students of law raise 
their special demands to the teacher, I am sure, just as 
theological students raise theirs). As an example, I will 
just mention that one of the main teaching bioethics 
to students from medicine or the natural sciences is 
to make the ethics-part of bioethics seem interesting. 
But when teaching philosophers and theologians the 
problem seems to be the reverse. They have a high 
competence-level within ethics and can be expected 
to find even Immanuel Kant interesting, but they often 
find the scientific background knowledge hard to grasp 
and boring. And as the teacher very often has the same 
educational background as the students, it can be very 
difficult to present molecular biology in an interesting 
and catching way to a group of theological students.
One way to seek to solve this problem is to have 
two teachers in each class – one that is trained in ethics 
and one that is trained in e.g. molecular biology. Or 
to at least have teachers with different backgrounds 
during the course. One thing is to suggest this solution; 
another is to make it work. My experience is that as a 
model of teaching it is highly dependent on the per-
sonal and didactical qualifications of the teachers and 
the relationship between them. The methodology has 
been used at the basic courses in ethics and philosophy 
of science for the past 5-6 years. For an evaluation of 
this please see Dich et al. 2005.
Another problem that arises from the fact that stu-
dents have very different prerequisitions due to their 
educational background is that it makes it very hard to 
teach students with different backgrounds at the same 
time. Gathering a group of interested students from 
different faculties at the university and then trying to 
teach them about the ethical problems in connection 
with genetic engineering is a beautiful idea, but the 
didactical problems will be enormous. But at the same 
time it is often the case that bioethics only thrives in 
such an inter-disciplinary environment, where the pre-
suppositions of both students and teachers are seriously 
challenged. Although I promised that I would give no 
solutions to the problems brought fort in this article, 
I will just state that one way of getting around this 
problem would be to begin by teaching the students 
with the same background and bring them to a certain 
level on the subjects that are unknown to them and 
then bring the students together afterwards at a com-
mon course.
2.5: The concept of guilt
The last challenge in teaching bioethics that I will 
touch upon here is closely related to the problems 
mentioned in the previous sections. But at the same 
time it transcends them all and should perhaps rather 
be seen as the basic challenge, both when teaching and 
doing bioethics. To explain it, I will begin with a very 
simple observation: It is very rare that we ask people: 
Why did you do that? when they have done something 
that we judge to be ethically good. In other words: 

































cally because we all want to be morally good (Well, 
almost all of us. One has to admit that bastards do exist). 
But sometimes we find ourselves in situations, where 
we become unsure about what the ethically right ac-
tion is. There are three reasons to this doubt.
2.5.1: Three reasons to be in doubt
The most common reason for ethical doubt is self-
deception. The problem is not that we do not know 
what is ethically right, but that we have other reasons 
and motives that make us do something else. But since 
we all want to be good, we have to invent some sort 
of conflict of interests that can be used to legitimize 
our actions to others and none the least to ourselves. It 
might be a worrying experience, but it is a good way 
to stay humble to just once in a while reflect upon 
the ethical value of one’s own arguments regarding 
e.g. eating meat or not supporting Red Cross or other 
humanitarian organisations. Part of doing bioethics is 
precisely to unmask these self-deceptions; a task that 
admittedly is much more fun when it is not turned 
against yourself.
Another reason that we might feel lost in a sort of 
ethical darkness is that we do not have a thorough 
understanding of the situation. It is a feeling that often 
creeps in on you, when you are faced with cases from 
ethical text-books. They usually state very briefly a 
few facts about the persons involved and then ask you 
to choose the ethically right action on a matter that 
means life and/or death to these persons.5 The remedy 
in this situation is not, I repeat is not to grab blindly in 
the bag with ethical principles in search of something 
that might fit the situation, but to insist upon gaining a 
deeper understanding of the situation and the persons 
involved in the hope that once we understand the 
situation better, the ethical fog will disappear.
A third reason that we might find ourselves in the 
dark regarding the right ethical choice in a situation 
is that it might be one of those situations, where there 
is no choice or course of action that is ethically good. 
From many parts of the ethical landscape it will be 
contested that such situations do not exist. A guess 
would be that almost all who holds that ethics is basi-
cally a human attempt to bring some order into a 
meaningless universe will say that as ethics is a human 
construction, we will either have to refine our existing 
principles/values/calculations or reconstruct them and 
then the situation will be back to normal. But if ethics 
is seen as something that humans encounter in their 
lives with each other as a demand that is put forward 
by something other than man (God, nature, reality, the 
universe, life itself),6 it is quite possible that we can find 
ourselves in situations, where there is no possibility to 
be good. As is perhaps the case in the question of the 
ethical concerns about stem cell research.
2.5.2: The ambiguous stem cells
In the current debate about using embryonic stem 
cells for research purposes there is a lot of calculating 
going on, albeit the two ends of the attitude-spectrum 
as always have clear-cut cases. Thus to those, who hold 
that the embryo has the same ethical significance as an 
adult person, embryonic stem cell research is ethically 
wrong in itself and nothing can justify doing it. At 
the other end you find those, who view the embryo 
as nothing more than biological material that can be 
used as we find fit. To them the only question is, if stem 
cell research is so promising that it should be funded. 
But to the rest of us who ascribes ethical significance 
both to the embryo and to the potential benefits in 
medical treatment that embryonic stem cell research 
might cause, it is a lot more difficult.
Some try to weigh the interests, the preferences, the 
rights and the ethical values that the different groups 
involved have against each other (embryos vs. future 
humans who will benefit from the supposed cures that 
the research will develop). An admittedly very noble 
occupation, but not very fruitful. Because what we have 
here is a genuine ethical dilemma. We have two groups 
of entities that we are ethically obliged to care for and a 
situation, where caring for one group leads to suffering 
for the other group. If you insist that the goal of ethics 
is to find the right or good action, you very often end 
up doing calculations that say something like: Killing a 
thousand embryos with x-value is wrong because the potential 
benefits of the research and the likelihood that it will succeed is 
only of y-value. Now this piece of mathematics is clearly 
dependent on a lot of valuing and that valuing cannot 
be done in an objective way. How much value we put 
on an embryo, the healing of a cancer-patient, to what 
extent we think that the research might be successful 
and so on is not decided by objective standards, but 
by who we are as persons embedded in our relations, 
societies, cultures and religions. So within bioethics you 
often find very firm convictions about a lot of subjects 
and a lot of questionable calculations to back them up. 
It is a little like experts that try to guess the result of a 
soccer-match on the basis of the two team’s statistics. 
It is all very interesting (if you happen to like soccer), 
but there are no guaranties that what they predict will 
be remotely connected to the actual result.
One way of dealing with the problem is to maintain 
that ethics is a human construction that at least has to 
try to come to an understanding of the problem that 
enables people to do the right thing although someti-
mes on the basis of shaky arguments. Another way is to 
leave ethics and join politics in the realization that it is 
a dirty world, where the concepts of good and bad are 
just relative concepts. But I would like to argue for a 
third possibility, a possibility that means using the word 
guilt – a word that is mysteriously lacking in much of 




























































2.5.3: Guilt as a basic condition
To humour me, please let us, at least for now accept 
that there may be ethical dilemmas – as for instance 
embryonic stem cell research – where there is no way 
of acting unambiguously good. How are we then to 
decide what to do? We can always go back to our 
struggling to be good and try to figure out a way, in 
which we can show that what we do is the ethically 
good thing in the situation (or at least the lesser evil). 
Indeed that is what the large majority of ethical coun-
cils, advisory boards and committees have been doing 
the last couple of years.7 But perhaps we could try to 
accept that ethics, and especially bioethics, is not so 
much about being and doing good, but about taking 
care of others and then ask the question: What kind of 
guilt can I live with?
To use the concept of guilt in the current bioethical 
discussion is possibly the most impossible impossibility 
that I have encountered yet within the business of 
doing and teaching bioethics.8 This could of course 
be seen as a sign that I should stop using it, since it is 
needless and stupid. Although I cannot rule out that 
possibility completely, I will try very briefly to state 
another reason, why it is so difficult to bring it in to the 
class room and the discussion and try to explain what 
could be gained from reflecting on bioethics with the 
possibility in mind that being human is being guilty.
I see three main reasons why the concept of guilt is 
so unpopular within contemporary secular bioethics. 
First of all it has religious connotations. Being guilty 
in an ethical sense simply sounds a little too much like 
being a sinner. And since the idea of a god in front 
of whom humans might be judged as sinners, has no 
place in a secular society, the notion of being guilty, 
especially when that guilt, as in the case of ethical 
dilemmas, cannot be avoided, seems wrong. Instead 
of taking upon us the responsibility for our actions, 
we excuse ourselves by pointing to the fact that we, 
as in the case of embryonic stem cell research, could 
not avoid harming someone and that the only guilty 
part in the whole question must be the universe that 
is created in such a way that these kinds of dilemmas 
arise. And since we do not believe in any sort of crea-
tor either, it does not make much sense to talk about 
guilt in connection with a universe that can be fully 
understood within the natural sciences as one big co-
incidence, so we sort of just forget about the matter, 
while telling each other that doing what we believe is 
the lesser evil, constitutes the ethical good action in the 
situation. In other words: It seems that it is impossible 
to talk about guilt in the ethical sense, because it is to 
closely associated with a religious way of thinking.
Another reason that guilt, if it were a person, would 
be sitting all alone at the back of the class room in a 
class on bioethics, is that from the »Ethics as a tool«-
perspective the concept of guilt seems very unprodu-
ctive. From a psychological point of view guilt can be 
seen as a negative inhibiting factor that prevents people 
from living fulfilling lives, where they have the energy 
and lust for life to make them able to help others.9
The third and most important reason why the 
concept of guilt is so totally absent from the current 
debate10 is that we have no idea of how to handle it. 
Guilt between living persons is perhaps the least dif-
ficult problem. The growing awareness of the need of 
finding ways to reconciliation between different ethnic 
groups, is a sign that even within a secularist framework 
the thought of forgiving is not totally lost. But if we 
turn to cases where the guilt is accepted as a reality 
(whether the guilt is caused by a deliberate action, a 
choice of the lesser evil or just plain carelessness) and 
the entity harmed is either dead or unable to enter 
into a dialogue of reconciliation (children, embryos, 
plants, mentally handicapped, animals etc.) the que-
stion becomes: How can we seek forgiveness? Since 
we have eradicated God as a possibility, it seems that 
we are faced with carrying the guilt alone. We finally 
end up in a situation, where we find that we are sort 
of existentially guilty, because we have chosen (and the 
reasons are not important at this point) to sacrifice an 
uncertain number of embryos to the benefit of poten-
tial cures of deadly diseases.
2.5.4: Løgstrup. the concept of guilt and beyond
This brings us into a situation, where there are three 
possibilities according to the Danish theologian K. E. 
Løgstrup. A: We can give up trying to act ethically. 
Having failed once to live up to our ethical standards, 
we simply stop trying altogether, either in respect for 
the victims that we have already created or because 
we become bitter and cynical from the experience of 
failing. B: We can deny that we are guilty and blame the 
evil done on society, nature, upbringing, circumstan-
ces, bad luck, misunderstandings, and chance. Only 
one thing is for sure – it is not our fault. This is, as I 
have already mentioned, probably the most common 
way of doing ethics – the ethics of self-deception. C: 
The third possibility when faced with inevitable guilt 
is (and this comes as no surprise to those who know 
that Løgstrup was a theologian) to live on the mercy 
and forgiveness of God. To trust that God will take 
care of victims that we have created and that he has 
forgiven us so that we have the courage to turn our 
attention away from our own guilt towards the needs 
of the other (Løgstrup 1972, p. 81).
To Løgstrup then the case is pretty clear. Either you 
break down, lie to yourself or become a Christian. But 
perhaps there are ways of dealing with guilt within a 
philosophical frame-work without having to convert 
to Christianity. One way, as I mentioned earlier, would 
be to ask the question: What kind of guilt can I live 
with? And that question should be posed both at the 
personal, the communitarian and the societal level. 

































become guilty in an ethical sense no matter what 
we do, would change the way bioethics is done and 
taught in a lot of ways, but I will mention just one: 
It would make us more humble towards the gigantic 
powers that biotechnology gives us to change both 
ourselves and the rest of nature. Being guilty means 
needing help and perhaps the realization that we need 
other people to help us carry our burden, would make 
us more aware of the fact that humans are basically 
social creatures, created by the relations that they are 
embedded in. Our lives are lives of inter-dependence, 
also when it comes to facing up to being guilty. And 
it would perhaps make us reflect a little more on the 
need for humility within bioethics, a humility that 
could be a safe-guard against the roaming visions of 
biotechnology.11 It might be so that the realization 
that ethics is not a question of securing our own 
goodness, but a question of understanding the needs 
of others and the acknowledgement that we, each and 
every one us, are guilty both in deliberate wrong-
doings and in situations where we choose betweens 
evils, is the best way to secure that we proceed with 
great care and humility, as we pursue all the gold 
that allegedly lies at the foot of the biotechnological 
rainbow.
3: And the answer is: 42
Salman Rushdie once wrote that every day asks us the 
question of the meaning of life and each night we lie 
like question marks in our beds. Doing and teaching 
bioethics could be seen in the same way. As I have tried 
to illustrate above, bioethical thinking and teaching is 
faced with a lot of challenges that there are no simple 
answers to. Some of them are implicit in the whole 
concept of ethics, others are specific to the different 
contexts that bioethics is to be taught in. Figuring out 
the answers – or perhaps more correctly: Continuing 
to wrestle the questions is nevertheless, as I see it, an 
ethical duty that each and every one of us is obliged 
to take upon us.12 Whether we are teachers and re-
searchers of bioethics or simply humans living in the 
biotech century (Rifkin 1999) we all have a respon-
sibility to participate in deciding how biotechnology 
should change our lives.
To some, ethics is a way of making the world ratio-
nal and controllable. As I think it should be clear by 
now, I do not agree with this perspective on ethics. I 
rather see it as a way of discovering how complex and 
ambiguous our lives are, when we try to understand 
how, when and why we are ethically committed to 
each other (and indeed to the rest of nature too). This 
is, from my point of view, the second most important 
message to get through to the students while attemp-
ting to juggle the other challenges already mentioned 
in this essay. The most important is a certain amount 
of humility towards the ability of the human mind to 
grasp once and for all the ethical difference between 
good and evil.
Or as it is told in The Hitch-Hiker’s Guide to the 
Galaxy: Once upon a time in a galaxy far far away a 
group of meta-intelligent beings from another dimen-
sion build a computer called Deep Thought to answer 
the question: What is the meaning of Life, the Universe 
and Everything? Deep Thought pondered that question 
for about seven and a half million years and then re-
vealed (much to the bewildering of the descendants 
of the original designers) that the answer is 42. This 
may seem rather disappointing, but according to Deep 
Thought the problem was (and is) that the question 
was not put precisely enough. And perhaps the real 
problem is that the texture of the universe is in such a 
way that the question and the answer cannot exist at 
the same time13. As soon as they are both known, the 
universe simply dissolves and is replaced by something 
even stranger.
This might leave you completely in the dark. But 
then, on the other hand, you might find some comfort 
in the belief that the answer to all our questions is 42, 
and that all we have to do is to ask our questions about 
life, the universe and everything in a better way. And 
that, should we succeed and finally phrase the questions 
in the right way, reality would just take one step up 
the bewilderment-ladder and leave us once again in 
the same sort of interesting, fascinating, worrying and 
challenging ethical mess that we live in today.
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Notes
1 Applying COmmon Sense To Own Experiences
2 And in this connection that means all disciplines that comes 
from outside the natural sciences and reflects upon these.
3 And this is of course a more than simplified picture of reality. 
There are many bioethicists coming from the natural sciences, 
who want to broaden the perspective and not just decide on a 
case-by-case basis and there are many coming from the other 
tradition that are very aware that doing bioethics involves a lot 
pragmatic thinking and a will to give a clear and practical advice. 
As a tendency it is true though, at least from my perspective. 
But that probably just brings us back to the problem: As we see 
things, we treat them, and as we have different perspectives on 
the world, we tend to see it differently
4 More and more ethics is becoming a mandatory subject within 
the life-sciences, which is a good thing. The amount of credit 
awarded for taking the classes and therefore the time available 
for teaching unfortunately still seems rather limited.
5 The cases presented in the appendix in Beauchamp & Childress 
are good examples of this. See Beauchamp & Childress 1994.
6 The Danish theologian K. E. Løgstrup calls his type of ethics 
ontological to show that the ethical demand is something that 
we are faced with independently of ourselves. See the appendix 
article in: Løgstrup 1997.
7 One noteworthy example where the word guilt is almost written 
is from The President Council on Bioethics (US) where those 
who support embryonic stem cell research in a report stated 
that: »In sum, what is owed the embryo is not the same protections, 
attachments, and rights as a human person; nor is it no respect at all. 
In making the decision to proceed with research on embryos or cloned 
embryos, we must do so only for the most compelling reasons – na-
mely, the reasonable expectation that such research will save human 
lives – and only with eyes open to the moral burden of doing what 
we believe to be morally best. Even as we establish the biological and 
moral grounds for using human embryos in certain forms of research, 
we must face and accept the solemnity of what we propose. Finally, we 
must proceed with the paradox that accompanies all human suffering 
and human imperfection in full view: that sometimes we seem morally 
obligated to do morally troubling things, and that sometimes doing what 
is good means living with a heavy heart in doing it«. The President’s 
Council on Bioethics, Washington, D.C. 2002, Chapter 6. The 
full report can be read at www.bioethics.gov.
8 Some will say that it is only impossible for those of us who 
feel the need to talk about guilt to make sense of some of the 
problems within bioethics. Many bioethicists think that they are 
doing quite all right without this religiously tainted concept and 
will probably feel that this is only a problem for some forms of 
bioethics, not for bioethics in general. But since my point is that 
many of the problems of dealing with conflicts of interests and 
other more or less airy attempts to try to distinguish between 
different entities and their ethical value at their roots all have 
a fear of the concept of guilt, I will claim that the reluctance 
towards the concept of guilt is a problem within bioethics in 
general.
9 It is very important to remember that guilt can have many faces 
(just as the evils we do to become guilty). If one is obsessed with 
guilt it quite possibly has the consequences outlined above. But 
it is not necessarily so that one becomes obsessed with guilt, 
just because one recognizes that one is guilty. There are both 
healthy and mentally disturbed kinds of feelings of guilt.
10 It appears within the literature written from the »Ethics as a 
light-bulb« perspective (and within religiously based bioethics) 
but is hardly ever discussed within the prevalent »Ethics as a tool« 
perspective. At the workshop we discussed bioethical problems 
for 4 days and not once did anybody say anything about what 
happened to people who did the wrong things – although the 
idea that they become ethically guilty is pretty obvious.
11 The American bioethicist Lee Silver has given an excellent 
example of what the future should not be like in his book 
Remaking Eden, although a lot of the technologies that lead to 
this kind of future are currently being developed.
12 As an ethicist I am fortunate enough to be allowed making 
normative claims about the duties of others. That is one of life’s 
great consolations. 
13 A couple of the meta-intelligent beings that are very focused on 
commercializing the answer from Deep Thought, suggest that 
the question to the answer 42 could be How many roads must 
a man walk down. But since we all are still here and the answer 
still seems to be 42, this cannot be true.
